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The preference of the ports of one State over those of
another is forbidden to Congress and not to the States, which
are firevented by the commerce clause and not the ninth
sedion of the First Article of'the Constitution.
Tle discrininationbetween States, and not individualports,
isforbidden to Congress, and therefore incidental advantages
can be given to a fport in the due exercise of the regulation
of commerce.
Until Congress makes some regulation of the charges for
the use of grain elevators and such other instruments of
interstate commerce as are situale wholly within a State,
licenses and charges may be fprescribed b , that State as
matters of local regulation.

While the especial law governing the instruments of
interstate cbmmerce must be passed'over, one of the Granger
Cases should be examined briefly on another question of
license, and this by the State and not by the United States.
zWunn v. The People of the State of Illinois (1877) 4 Otto

(94 U. S.) 113, began by an information filed June 29, 1872,
by the State's attorney of the seventh judicial circuit of the
State of Illinois, against Ira Y. Munn and George L. Scott,
for transacting in the City of Chicago, the business- of
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public warehousemen, without the license required by the
State law of April 25, 1871 (Laws, page 762). It is unnecessary to go further in the details of this case than add that
the defendants -were convicted in the Criminal Court of
Cook County, July 6, 1872, and that this conviction was
affirmed in the State Supreme Court, January 30, 1874, on
an opinion by Chief Justice BI sE: (69 Ill. 8o). McALLISTER and ScoTT, JJ., dissented, among other. reasons,
because such licenses were regulations of interstate commerce, the former putting the case thus :The Chicago River, running West from its connection with Lake
MIichigan about a mile, and then dividing into two branches, one North
and the other South, running through the City, forms the port of Chicago.
The warehouse in question, and probably all others at which this statute
was aimed, are situated upon this port, and constitute the direct and
indispensable accessions to commerce in grain upon the great lakes,
between that port and other States, and the question arises, can these
accessiong to such commerce be suppressed by the State government?
The Act was not necessary for the preservation of the health,
the morals, or the safety of the community, which ard the true purposes
of the police power; but its purpose was to compel the warehousemen to
conduct their business upon a compensation prescribed by the State:
(69 Ill. IOI, 1O3).

The judgment was then removed to the Supreme Court
of the United States, and there finally affirmed, March I,
1877, on an opinion by Chief Justice WAITE, denying the
repugnancy of the Illinois Act (i) to the Fourteenth
Amendment, because private property when devoted to
public use, is subject to public regulation; (2) to the pref-

erence clause of the First Article (siora, page 424), or (3)
to the cominerge clause (szqfra, page 42o,) as to which latter,
the words of the opinion were:It was very properly said in the case of the State Tax on Railroad
Gross Receibls (1873), 15 Wall. (82 U. S.) 293, that "It is not every thing
that affects commerce that amounts to a regulation of it, within the
meaning of the Constitution." The warehouses of these plaintiffs in
error are situated, and their business carried on exclusively within the
limits of the State of Illinois. They are used as instruments by those
engaged in the State, as well as those engaged in interstate commerce,
but they are no more necessarily a part of commerce itself than the dray
or the cart by which, but for them, grain would be transferred from one
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railroad station to another. Incidentally they may become connected with
interstate commerce, but not necessarily so. Their regulation is a thing
of domestic concern and certainly, until Congress acts in reference to
their interstate relations, the State may exercise all the powers of government over them, even though in so doing, it may indirectly operate upon
commerce outside its immediate jurisdiction. We do not say that a case
may not arise in which it will be found that a State under the form of
regulating its own affairs, has encroached upon the exclusive domain of
Congress in respect to interstate commerce, but we do say that, upon the
facts as they are represented to us in this record, that has not been done:
WAI TE, C. J., Aunuit v. II. (1877), 4 Otto (94 U. S.) 113, 135.

While the authority of Aitmhn v. Illinois may be considered as shaken, by Chicago, Al. & St. P. RR. Co. v. State of
Minnesota (890); 134 U. S. 418, so far as the interpretation
of the due process of law secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment, the interpretation of the State's right to
regulate commerce appears to be so conformable to the
general principle of Cooley v. Port .i-ardens (ante, page 466),
and Hilson v. The Mgarsh Co. (ante, 445), that it is sound
law upon a subject of great importance, notwithstanding
the manifest error of the Chief Justice in comparing grain
elevators -with carts and drays, and thus overlooking their
storage capacity. In this respect, iflunn v. Illinois has been
recognized by Justice LAMAR, in (idd v. Pearson (1888),
128 U. S. I, 23 ;-Chief Justice WAITE himself, -in lallv.
De C11ir (1878), 5 Otto (95 U. S.) 485, 487;-Justice
BRADLEY, in Pzila. &" S. M. Sleamsh
Co. v. Pa: (1887),
122 U. S. 326, 346, adding that Mfunn v. Illinois was
explained upon this point by the decisions in W~abas,, St. L.
& P. RR. Co. v. llinois (1886), ii8, U. S. 557, 564, 594,
and szoi-r, pages 762, 537 (where the State was not allowed
even to prevent discrimination in interstate transportation);
the wharfage cases (where the fees were allowed, infra,
page 817, only -when imposed in good faith and for fair
remuneration, the subject not requiring a single, uniform,
rule), that is; Keoktk N L. Packet Co. v. Keokuk (1877), 5
Otto (95 U. S.) 8o, affirmed in Nortliz'estern Union Ricket
Co. v. St. Louis (i88o), io Otto (ioo U. S.) 423 (as observed
by Justice MILLER, in Edye v. Robertson (1884), 112 U. S.
580, 596, and suqbra, page 466), which latter case was fol-
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lowed in Ticksburg v. Tobin (I880), io Otto (ioo U. S.)
430; Cincinnati, P. B. G. &' P.Packet Co. v, Catlettsburg
(1882) 15 Otto (IOS U. S.) 559; Parkersburg& Ohio River
Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg(1883), 37 Otto (107 U. S.) 691
and supra, pages 762, 508, 533; and generally, Ouachita &
Miss. R. Packet Co. v. Aiken (1887), 12T U. S. 444; Mobile
County v. Kimball (1881), 12 Otto (lo2 U. S.) 691, (where
justice FIELD explained the divergence of views formerly existing among the Jdstices, as due to their not always keeping
in mind the distinction between commerce and the local aids,
instruments or measures for the improvement of commerce ;
the controlling principle being that of Cooley v. Port Wardens, supra, page 466, as pointed out by Justice MATTIIEWS,
inBowan v. Chicago &XN. TV RR. Co., 1888, 125 U. S.
page 732; Coe V.
465, 485); Brown v. Houston, .stra,
Errol, infra, page 821.
It is, of course, outside of the present subject to do more
than add here that commerce within a State has been emphatically relegated to State regulation alone by such decisions
as The Railroad C'ommission Cases of Stone v. Farmers L.
& T. Co. (1886) 116 U. S. 307 ; and Louisville, _M 0. &"
Texas .R?. Co. v. Mississififi (1890) 133 Id. 587.
That the-preference clause (supra, page 424) affected the
power of Congress, and not of the States, was recognized as
properly decided in Afminu v. Illinois,by Justice B3LATCHFORD,
in Jolmson v. Chicago 6 P. Elevator Co. (I886), 119 U. S.
388, 400, referring also to iloianv. La. (1886),. 118 Id. 455 ;
467. This had been pointed out as early as the -Passenger
Cases (1849), 7 How. (48 U. S.) 283, 414, byJustice WAYNE,
and, not long after, with more precision, while sustaining an
act of Congress authorizing a bridge, where it was pointed out
that Congress could not even consider the expediency of
common and equal privileges.
Thus much is undoubtedly embraced in the prohibition, and it may cer-

tainly also embrace any other description of legislation looking to a direct privilege, or preference of the ports ot any particular State over
those of another. Indeed, the clause, in terms, seems to import a prohibition against some positive legislation by Congress, to this effect, and
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not against any incidental advantage thaC might possibly result from the
legislation of Congress upon other subjects connected with commerce,
and confessedly within its power. Besides it is a mistake to assume that
Congress is forbidden to give a preference to a port in one State over a
port in another. Such preference is given in every instance where it makes
a port in one State, a port of entry, and refuses to make anbther port in
another State, a port of entry. No greater preference, in one sense, can
be more directly given than in this way ; and yet the power of Congress
to give such preference has never been questioned. Nor can it be, without asserting that the moment Congress makes a port in one State, a port
of entry, it is bound, at the same time, to make all other ports, in all
other States, ports of entry. The truth seems to be, that what is forbidden,
is not discrimination between individual ports within the same or different
States, but discrimination between States; and if so, in order to bring
this case within the prohibition, it is necessary to show, not merely discrimination between Pittsburg and Wheeling, but discrimination between
the ports of Virginia and those of Pennsylvania: NErsoN, J., P . v.
Wheeling & B. Bridge Co. (1856), iS How. (59 U. S.) 421, 435.
XX.

A State cannot declare what Produce of another State may
be owned or possessed within its borders.
The Courts, and not the State legislatures,are the fproper
organs ofgovernment id decide whether quarantine or other
freventative folice regulations do not extend beyond the
danger afifrehended,into regulation of interstate commerce.
A State cannot exclude all cattle coming from another
State, as the folice fpower extends only to the exclusion of those
diseased andfitfor the restrictionsof quarantinelaws.
Were insection of cattle must be made such a brief lime
before slqughter as to frevent the carriage of the carcasses
Jrom one State to another, this is a case where interstate
commerce can only exist under generallaws, fassed by Congress, and State legislation is void.
Cases within the operation of State inspection laws, as
well as those of quarantine, do not fall within the limits of
this article, except the few recent ones where the suppositions adyanced for the validity of the State laws require attention.
The first of these cases arose in 1873, before S. K.
VOL. XXXVII.-5 1
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Justice of the Peace for Kidder Township, Caldwell County,
Missouri, by John T. Husen claiming damages of The Han-"
nibal & St. Jo. RR. Co. for death of cattle by fever communicated by Texas cattle brought in by the defendants.
This proceeding was underAN ACT to amend an Act entitled An Act to prevent the introduction
into this State, of Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle, during certain seasons
of the year, approved February 26, 1869. (Approved January 23, I87;
Laws, pages 172-3.)
Be it enacted, etc. S * * SEcTION i. No Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle shall be driven, or otherwise conveyed into, or remaini in, any
county of this State, between the first day of March and the first day of
November in each year, by any person or persons whatsoever; Provided,
That nothing in this section shall apply to any cattle which have been
kept the entire previous winter in this State; Providedfurther, That
when such cattle shall come across the line of this State, loaded upon a
railroad car or steamboat, and shall pass through this State without being
unloaded, such shall not be construed as prohibited by this Act; but the
railroad company, or owners of a steamboat performing such transportation, shall be responsible for all damages which may result from the
disease called the Spanish or Texas fever, should the same occuralongthe'
line of such transportation; and the existence of such disease along such
route, shall beprimafacie evidence that' such disease has been communicated by such transportation.

The Justice gave judgment against the Railroad Company,
which was affirmed on appeal to the State Circuit Court of,
Grundy County, and again on appeal, June 21, 1875, by the
State Supreme Court (6o Mo. 226), upon the authority of
Wilson v. The Kansas City, etc., RR. Co. (Id. 184). The,
State Court denied that the Constitutional provision had
been infringed. After explaining that such cattle were
liable, at certain seasons of the year, to communicate disease
to native cattle, and the impossibility of selecting out the
dangerous animals, the Court proceeded to state thatThe right of a State to enact such police regulations as are necessary to
protect her citizens from contagious and dangerous disease, and to protect their property from calamity, or destruction, cannot be denied. Such
regulations by a State are in no sense, an attempt to regulate commerce
among the States. Such police powers were never delegated to Congress ;
and, indeed, could not be without a total surrender, on the par.t of the
State, of the power to protect, or preserve her own citizens. Congress.
is not to be looked to by the citizens of a State for such police regulations
as will protect theniselves and their property from. disease and consequent
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destruction. These police regulations reside in the legislative power of'
.the State, and their exercise is not in conflict -with the provision of the
Constitution referred to. And it makes no difference that such regulations, when adopted by the State for such a purpose, should incidentally,
in some slight degree, affect the commerce carried on between citizens of
different States (Lewis v. Boffinger, 1853, 19 Mo. 13 ; Cityof St. Louis v.
AIcCoy, 1853, iS Id. 238): VORIES, J., Wilson v. RR. Co. (1875), 6o Id.
197-8.

The learned Judge, in these sentiments, followed the
Supreme Court of Illinois, in their decisions sustaining a
similar law in that State; of which he cited Yeael v. Alex-.
ander (1871), 58 Ill. 255; Steavens v. Browz, Id. 289;
Somerville v. M~onks, Id. 371; Chicago 6 A. RR. Co. v.
Gassaway (1875), 7' Id. 570. This Illinois law was a model
of brevity, as aside from three sections putting the first into
force, it wasAN ACT to prevent the importation of Texas or Cherokee cattld into
the State of Illinois. (Approved, February 27, 1867; Laws, page 169).
SECTrioN . Be it enacted,etc., That it shall not be lawful for any one to
bring into this State, orown, or have in possession any Texas or Cherokee
cattle.

The Missouri judgment was then removed to the Supreme
Court of the United States, and there reversed on a unanimous opinion by Justice STRONG, because the statute in
question did violate the commerce clause of the Constitution.
In answer to the position taken by the State courts, the opinion proceededWe are thus brought to the question whether the Missouri statute is a
lawful exercise of the police power of the State. We admit that the deposit
in Congress, of the power to regulate foreig commerce and commerce
among the States, was not a surrender of that which may properly be denominated police power. 'What that power is, it is difficult to define with
sharp precision. It is generally said to extend to making regulations prom6tiveof domestiQ order, morals, health, and safety. .
"
All
these exertions of power are in immediate connection with the~protection
of persons and property against noxious acts of other persons, or such a
use of property as is injurious to the property of others. They are selfdefensive.
But whatever may be the nature and reach of the police power of a State,
itcannot be exercised over a subject confided exclusively to Congress, by
the Federal Constitution. It cannot invade the domain of the national
government: STRoxG, J., RR. Co. v. IHsen (1878), 5 Otto (95 U. S.) 465,
A70, 471 ; S. C. 17 A-MERICAN LAw REGISTER, x64.
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That is, the statute was declared unconstitutional, because
it embraced all cattle, even if free from disease : Chief Justice
WAITE, dissenting in Bowman v. Chicago &N W. RR. Co.
(I888), 125 U. S. 465, 513; Justice GRAY, dissenting in
Leisy v. Hardin (I89O), 135 Id. 100, 153, and sz#ra, page
537; Justice FIELD, Kimmisz v. Ball (1889), 129 U.S. 217,
221.
In coming to such a conclusion, we have not overlooked the decisions
of very respectable courts in Illinois, where statutes similar to the one we
have before us, have been sustained. [supra, page 8o3] Regarding the
statutes as mere police regulations, intended to protect domestic cattle
against infectious disease, those courts have refused to inquire whether the
prohibition did not extend beyond the danger to be apprehended, and,
whether, therefore, the statutes were not something more than exertions
of police power. That inquiry, they have said, was for the legislature and
not for the courts. With this we cannot concur. The police power of a
State cannot obstruct foreign commerce, or interstate commerce, beyond
the necessity for its exercise; and under color of it, objects not within its
scope, cannot be secured at the expense of the protection afforded by the
Federal Constitution. And as its range sometimes comes very near to the
field committed by the Constitution to Congress, it is the duty of the
courts to guard vigilantly against any needless intrusion : STRONG, J., RR.
Co. v. Husen (1878), 5 Otto (95 U. S.) 465, 473-4; s. c. 17 AMERICAW
LAW RiEGISTER, 164.

Before Husen's case began, the Illinois act (slora,page 803),
was amended so as to read
SEcTIoN I. Be it enacted,etc., That it shall not be lawful for any person
or persons, railroad company or other corporation, or any association of
persons, to bring into this State, any Texas or Cherokee cattle, except between the first day of October and the first day of March following, of each
year: Provided, that the right to bring into this State any such cattle,
shall in no case be any defense for any injury sustained to any one, by
reason of the bringing of such cattle into this State.
SECTION 2. That it shall not be lawful for any person or persons, within
this State, to own, or have in possession or control, any Texas or Cherokee cattle, at any time, which may have been brought into this State at
any timeexcept between the first day of October and the first day of March
following, of each year.
Act of April 16, 1869, Laws page 402; the other sections merely enforcing the above.

Following the Husen case, this amendatory act was declared unconstitutional in Sal-enstein et at. v. Afavis (1879),
91 I11 391 ; Chciago &A. RR. Co. v. Erickson, Id. 613, and
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Jarviset al. v. Riggin (1879), 94 Id. 164. In the first of
these cases, the effort to sustain the Second Section of this
Act was thus denied:If the legislature has the constitutional right to declare that a person
shall not possess, or own, a certain kind of property within the State,
which may be raised or produced in another State of the Union, it logically
follows that all interstate commerce in such property is both regulated by
the legislature and also prohibited. We do not understand that the legislature can do, indirectly, that which the Constitution of the United States
prohibits to be done directly: CRMG, C. J., Salzenstein.el al. v. Alfavis
(1879), 91 Ill. '391, 401.

The State of Iowa adopted (April 8, i868; x2 . A. 272)
a statute almost as stringent as the Illinois act of 1867
(Sufira, page 803); but in the Code of i88o, these provisions were so modified as to secure the approval of the Supreme Court of the United States (Kimmis] v. Ball, 1889,
129 U. S. 217), on a unanimous opinion by Justice FiFLD.
The sections of the Code thus declared valid police regulations, wereSEc. 4o58. If any person bring into this State, any Texas cattle, he shall
be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisoned in the
county jail not exceeding thirty days, unless they have been wintered at
least one winter, north of the Southern boundary of the State of Missouri
or Kansas: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed
t, prevent or make unlawful the transportation of such cattle through
this State on railways, or to prohibit the driving through any part of this
State, or having in possession, any Texas cattle, betveen the first day of
November and the first day of April following.
SEC. 4059. If any person, now or hereafter, has in his possession, in
this State, any such Texas cattle, he shall be liable for iny damages that
may accrue froth allowing said cattle to run at large andthereby spreading
the disease known as the Texan fever, and shall be punished as is prescribed in the preceding section.

The case cited began in the United States Circuit Court
for the Southern District of Iowa, by P. C. Kimmish suing
for damages suffered by loss of cattle, infected in June, 1885,
by the Texas herd of the defendants, which had not been
wintered as required by Section 4058. On a demurrer in
March Term 1888, theJustices were opposed in their opinion of the Constitutionality of Section 4059, and the case
was then certified to the Supreme Court of the United States
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upon this difference of opinion.
Between the time
Kimmish lost his cattle by infection, and the trial of the demurrer, these sections were repealed and the following were
substituted :SEcTION 4058. Any person or persons driving any cattle into this State,
or any agent, servant, or employe of any railroad, or other corporation,
who shall carry, transport, or ship any cattle into this State, or any railroad company, or other corporation, or person, who shall carry, ship or
deliver any cattle into this State, or the owners, controllers, lessees, or
agents, or employes of any stock yards, receiving into such stock yards,
or in any other enclosures for the detention of cattle in transit, or shipment, or reshipment or sale, any cattle brought or shipped in any manner into this State, which at the time they were either driven, brought,
shipped or transported into this State, were in such condition as to infect
with, or to communicate to other cattle, pleuro-pneumonia, or splenitic
or Texas fever, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon .conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than three hundred
dollars, and not more than one thousand dollars, or by fine and imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the
Court.
SEc. 4o59. Any person who shall be injured, or damaged by any of the
acts of persons named in Section 4o58, and which are prohibited by such
section, in addition to the remedy therein provided, may bring an action
at law against any such persons, agents, employes, or corporations mentioned therein, and recover the actual damages sustained by the person
or persons so injured, and neither said criminal proceeding, nor said civil
action, in any stage of the same, [shall] be a bar to a conviction or to a
recovery in the other: Act of April io, 1886; 21 G. A. 182-3.

Justice FTELD pointed out that the Texas cattle, against
which the law was directed, were those which had not been
wintered North of a fixed line. South of this line the cattle were supposed to become infected- with the 'germs of a
distemper which would be communicated to other cattle,
feeding in the same pasture, unless these germs were destroyed by the cold usual to the North of the fixed line.
Against such sanitary.precauti ons, there could be no Constitutional objections; the action being for damages, brought
before the Court section 4059 and not section 4058, and
there could not be the slightest doubt that a person, permitting diseased cattle to run at large, could be made to.answer
for the consequences. Such liability could not be escaped
by reason either of the origin of the cattle (under the com-
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merce clause, szjlra, page 420), or of the defendant's domiicile in another State (under the equal rights clause of the
Constitution, szqra, page 515).
Similar decisions .under the same law had been made in
Swfit v. Suikin, Sept. 13, 1889, U. S. Circ. Ct., N. Dist.
Ill., 39 Fed. Repr. 630; lit re Clzristian, I889, by the judges of
the Eleventh judicial Dist. of Minn., Id. 636, note.
In Indiana, a similar conclusion had been reached in the
State Circuit Court for Porter County (Harvey v. Huffmaf,
1889, 39 Fed. Repr. 646, note), uponAN ACT for the protection of the public health by promoting the growth
and sale of healthy cattle and sheep, makingit a misdemeanor to sell the
same without inspection before slaughtering within this State, and to
authorize cities to appoint inspectors. (Approved, March 2, 1889, Laws,
page iso.)
SEcTIoN i. It shall be illegal to sell, or offer, or expose for sale, in
any incorporated city within this State, beef, mutton, lamb or pork, for
human food; except as hereinafter provided, which has not been inspected
alive within the county, by an inspector, or his deputy, duly appointed
by the authorities of said county in which said beef, mutton, lamb or
pork, is intended for consumption, and found by such inspector to be
pure, healthy, and merchantable ; and for every such offense, the accused,
after conviction, shall be fined not more than two hundred dollars, nor
less than ten.
. SEC. 2. That the City Council is hereby empowered and required to
appoint, in each incorporated city within the county, one or more inspectors and deputies, furnish the necessary blanks, and decree the fees
for such inspection: Provided,That where farmers slaughter cattle, sheep
or swine of their own raising or feeding, for human food, no other inspection shall be required, or penalty enforced, than such as are already
provided by law to prevent the sale and consumption of diseased meats.
SEc. 3. Nothing herein contained shall prevent or obstruct the sale of
cured beef or pork known as dried, corned, or canned beef, or smoked or
salted pork, or other cured or salted meats.

That is, the Act prevented the introduction of all dressed
fresh meats, articles of commerce extensively carried from
State to State. No discrimination was made between sound
or diseased meat, and no provjision for inspection. Of course,
such a law coufd not be valid.
One of the latest of these cattle cases began with the
conviction of Henry E. Barber before a justice of the Peace
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in Ramsey County, Minnesota, for a violation of the fourth
section ofAN ACT for the Protection of the Public Health by Providing for Inspection before Slaughter of Cattle, Sheep and Swine Designed for
Slaughter for Human Food. (Approved, April 16, 1889; Laws, p. 51.)
SEcTIoN i. The sale of any fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb, or pork, for
human food, in this State, except as hereinafter provided, is hereby prohibited.
SIc. 2. It shall be the duty of the several local boards of health ofthe
several cities, villages, boroughs and townships within this State, to appoint one or more inspectors of cattle, sheep and swine, for saidcity, village, borough or township, who shall hold their offices for one year, and
"until their successors are appointed and qualified, and whose authority and
jurisdiction shall be territorially co-extensive with the board so appointing them; and said several boards shall regulate the form of certificate to
be issued by such inspectors, and the fees to be paid them by the person
applying for such inspection, which fees shall be no greater than are actually necessary to defray the costs of the inspection provided for in Section Three of this Act,
SEc. 3. It shall be the duty of the inspector appointed hereunder, to
inspect all cattle, sheep and swine, slaughtered for human food within
their respective jurisdictions, within twenty-four hours before the slaughter
of the same, and, if found healthy, and in suitable condition to be slaughtered for human food, to give to the applicant a certificate in writing to
that effect. If found unfit for food, by reason of infectious disease, such
inspectors shall order the immediate removal and destruction of such
diseased animals, and no liability for damages shall accrue by reason of
such action.
SEc. 4. Any person who shall sell, expose, or offer for sale for human
food, in this State, any fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb or pork, whatsoever, which has not been taken from an animal inspected and certified
before slaughter by the proper local inspector, appointed hereunider, shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall
be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three months, for each offense.
Sc. 5. Each and every certificate made by inspectors under the provisions of this Act, shall contain a statement to the effect that the animal
or animals inspected, describing them as to kind and sex, were, at the
date of such inspection, free from all indication of disease, apparently in
good health, and in fit condition, when inspected, to be slaughtered for
human food; a duplicate of which, certificate shall be preserved in the
office of the inspector.

Court
Barber then petitioned the United States
for the District of Minnesota for a habeas corb5us, alleging
the State law to be in conflict with the commerce and equal
CCircuit
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rights clauses of the Constitution: this was the opinion of the
District Judge, Hon. RENSSELAER R. NELSON: fit re
Barber, September 23, 1889 (39 Fed. Repr. 641), who released Barber. The State then appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States, where the law was again declared unconstitutional, May 19, 189o (r36 U. S. 313), on a
unanimous opinion by Justice HARLAN from which some
extracts may be added:Underlying the entire argument, on behalf of the State, is the proposition that it is impossible to tell, by an inspection of fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb or pork, designed for human food, whether or not it came from
animals that were diseased when slaughtered: that inspection on the hoof,
within a very short time before animals are slaughtered, is the only mode
by which their condition can be ascertained with certainty. And itis it.sisted, with great confidence, that of this fact, the Court must take judicial notice. * * * * (136 U. S. 320-1.)
But if, as alleged, the inspection of fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb or
pork, will not necessarily show whether the animal from which it was
taken, was diseased when slaughtered, it would not follow that a statute
like the one before us is within the Constitutional power of the State to
enact. On the contrary, the enactment of a similar statute by each one
of the States composing the Union, would result in the destruction of commerce among the several States, so far as such commerce is involved in
the transportation from one partof the country to another of animal meats
designed for human food, and entirely free from disease. A careful examination of the Minnesota Act will place this construction of it beyond
question.

"

*

(Id.

321.)

As the inspection must take place within the twenty-four hours immediately before the slaughtering, the Act, by its necessary operation, excludes from the Minnesota market, practicall all fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb or pork-in whatever form, and although sound, healthy, and
fit for human food-taken from animals slaughtered in other States ; and
directly tends to restrict the slaughtering of animals, whose meat is to be
sold in Minnesota for human food, to those engaged in such business in
that State.

*

*

**

When to this is added the fact that the statute, by its necessary operation, prohibits the sale, in the State, of fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb or
pork, from animals that may have been inspected carefully and thoroughly
in the State where they were slaughtered, and before they were slaughtered, no doubt can remain as to its effect upon commerce among the
several States. It will not do to say-certainly no judicial tribunal can,
with propriety, assume-that the people of Minnesota may not, with due
regard to their health, rely upon inspections in other States of animals
slaughtered for purposes ofhumah food. (Id. 322.)

For authority, the opinion cited ff oodruff v. Parham,
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fizsou v. Loll, Wellon v. M:fissouri Hannibal & St. . RR.
Co. v. Husen, Guy v. Balimore and Valling v. fichigan
(szra,pages 728, 735, 751, 8o1, 817, 738), to show that no
State could discriminate against the products of other States
in this manner; not even if the burden fell equally upon
citizens and travelers, for that kind of equality contravened
the principles of Robbins v. Taxing District, sufr-a, page
758, and'the Slate Freight Tax Case (1873), 15 Wall. (82
U. S.) 232; and consequently no analogy was permitted to
be drawn from Pallersonv. Kentucky, sura,page 742.
XXI.

Auction sales of originaljfackagesofforeigni origin, cannot
be taxed direcly or by license exacted from the auclioneei.
Otherwise of goods Produced in one of the Slates of the
Union.
A State maj, lay a general tax uon a kind of business,
the subjects of whzi-h may enter into interstate and foregn
commerce, so long as that commerce is not made a matler of
p~rivilege.
Cook v. The Commonweallt of Pennsylvania (1878), 7
Otto (97 U. S.) 566, was another instance where a State
undertook to lay a tax on the privilege of selling foreign
goods at auction, notwithstanding the principles of Brown
v. Maryland (sup-a, page 439). The State authorities of
Pennsylvania, January 31, 1871, settled an account against
Samuel C. Cook, an auctioneer of the City of Philadelphia,
for, non-payment of State taxes claimed to be due upon
auction sales of foreign goods in the original packages,
underSnc. M8. That hereafter the State duty, to be paid on sales by auction
in the counties of Philadelphia and Allegheny, shall be on all domestic
articles and groceries, one-half of one per cent. ; on foreign drugs, glass,
earthen-ware, hides, marble, wool, and dye-woods, three-quarters of one
per cent: Act of May 20, 1853, P. L. 679.
Sec. 6. That said auctioneers shall pay into the treasury of the Comnmonwealth, a tax or duty of one-fourth of one per centum on all sales of
loans or stocks, and shall also pay into the treasury aforesaid, a tax or
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duty, as required by existing laws, on all other sales to be nade as aforesaid, except on groceries, goods, wares and merehandise of American
growth or manufacture, real-estate, shipping or live stock; and it shall be
the duty of the auctioneer having charge of such sales, to collect and pay
over to the State treasurer, the said duty or tax, and give a true and correct account of the same, quarterly, under oath or affirmation, in the form
now required by law: Act of April 9, 1859, P. L. 436.

A few days after the decision ii Cook's case, this exception
in favor of American goods was removed by the Act of May
19, 1871 (P. L. 270), but the question was decided on the

broader ground of taxation of original packages of foreign
orign.
Following the practice in that State, Cook appealed to
the Dauphin County Court, where judgment was rendered
against him, on an opinion by PEARSON, P. J., May i6,
1871, in which Brown v. .tl~aryh&nd was recognized, but
held inapplicable because the tax was not laid on the importer, but upon the auctioneer, as was done .in Nalhans v.
Lozizsiana (i85o), 8 How. (49 U. S.) 73, in the case of a
dealer in foreign bills of exchange. But the comparison was
inaccurate, because in the latter case, the unanimous opinion of the Court upheld the validity of the tax, as was afterwards done in Br-wn v. Hozs/on (sz5;-a, page 732), becauseNo one can claim exemption from a general tax on his business, within the State, on the ground that the products sold, may be used in commerce. No State can tax an export, or an import, as shch, except under
the limitations of the Constitution. But before the article becomes an export, or after it ceases to be an import, by being mingled with other
property in the State, it is a subject of taxation by the State. A cottonbroker may be required to pay a tax upon his business, or by way of
license, although he may buy and sell cotton for foreign exportation:
McLEx, J., Nathans v. La. (I85O), 8 How. (49 U. S.) 73, 8o-1.

The Pennsylvania Judge also based his opinion upon this
remark by Chief Justice MARSHALL, in answer to the argnment, so often advanced in subsequent cases but never with
effect upon the Court (szra,pages 462, 491), that the Constitutional power ceased from the instant the goods entered
the State:Auctioneers are persons licensed by the State, and if the importer
chooses to employ them, he can as little object to paying for this service,
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as for any other for which lie may apply to an officer of the State. The
right of sale may very well be annexed to importation, [as was this case]
without annexing to it, also the privilege of using the officers licensed by
the State to make sales in a peculiar way [as was not claimed or the
case, supra, page 439]: MARSHALL, C. J., Brown v. M1aryland (1827), 12
Wheat. (25 U. S.) 419, 443.

The case was heard in the Pennsylvania Court, upon a
case stated, which was not clear upon the necessity for the
use of an auctioneer by the importer, and consequently the
County Judge considered himself justified in taking for
granted that the employment of the auctioneer was a mere
convenience, although the Act of 1859 provided:SEcTIon 8. It shall not be lawful for any person, or persons, to make
sales by auction, or by public outcry, in the City of Philadelphia, or
County of Allegheny, of real estate, stocks, loans, vessels, merchandise
and personal property of any description, except it be by a duly commissioned auctioneer of the said City or County: Provided, That this Act
shall not be so construed as to interfere with any sales authorized by the
Courts of said City or County, or in consequence of any legal proceeding
whatever, or of personal property sold in consequence of the owner declining business or housekeeping: Act of April 9, 1859, P. L. 436.

This judgment was affirmed in the State Supreme Court,
May 23, 1873, without any opinion being filed- but reversed
by the.Supreme Court of the United States upon a unanimous opinion by justice MILLER, because the tax was on
the privilege of selling the foreign goods.
It is said that the importer could himself have made sale of his goods,
without subjecting the sale to the tax. The argument is fallacious, because without an auctioneer's license he could not have sold at auction,
even his own goods. If he had procured, or could have procured a
license, he would then have been subject, by the statute, to. the tax, for it
makes no exception. By the express language of the statute, the auctioneer is to collect this tax, and pay it into the treasury. From whom is
he to collect it, if not from the owner of the goods ? If the tax was intended to be levied on the auctioneer he would not have been required
first to collect it and then pay it over: IILLER, J., Cook v.. Pa. (1878), 7
Otto (97 U. S.) 566,570-I.

That the tax for the privilege of selling, did fall upon the
goods where the State could not directly place it, was then
declared upon the principles expounded in the Passenger
Cases, Crandall v. Nevada, Henderson v. The iMayor and
Wellon v. M~issouri(supra, pages 460, 463, 465, 751), with-
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out going back to their orig-in in Brown v. Maryland (sitfira,
page 439)- Upon this point, Cook v. Pa. has been recognized by Justice SWAYNE, in Afach. Co. v. Gage, safira,page
753 ; Chief Justice WAITE, in Western U. Tel. Co. v. Texas
(1882), 15 Otto (1O5 U. S.) 460, 465; Justice MILLER himself, in Fargov. Michigan (1887), 121 U. S. 230, 244 ; Chief
Justice FuLLER as well as the dissenting Justices in the
OriginalPackage Case, szora, pages 508, 535.
XXIL

0

Insfection laws are not derivedfom any piower to regulate
commerce, butfrom right of every State to improve the quality of domestic articlesbefore they enter into commerce, domestic, interstateorforeign.
Inspiection laws are a part of State legislation embracin
everything within the territory of the State which has not
been Placedin the care and control of the government of the
UnitedStates.
Legitimate inspection laws relateto the quality of the artides, or their form, or cabacity, or the dimensions andweight
of theirpackages, as ascertained by a Public officer at any
reasonableplacefix.ed by law.
Inequitable but legitimate inspection laws can only be
remedied by Congress and not by the Courts, when the States
persist in enforcing them.
Laws requiringtobacco casks to be weighed and measured
at aparticularPlace,before transportation out of the State,
are legitimate inspection Laws, though no suck Provisionsare
enacted as to tobaccotransportedfrom _place to lace within the
State.
Turnerv. .Maryland(1883), 17 Otto (107 U. S.) 38, was
a case of inspection prescribed for goods destined to points
without the State, just as Crandallv. Nevada, (supra, page
463) was a tax on passengers departing from the State. The
difference between a legitimate inspection fee and a tax on
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outward commerce caused the former to be sustained while
the latter was declared void.
The .case began by the presentment of Henry A. Turner,
September 18, i88o, in the Criminal Court of the City of
Baltimore, for shipping to Bremen, in Germany, a hogshead
of tobacco raised by him in Charles County, in that State,
without having been inspected to ascertain whether the
hogshead was of the dimensions and weight required by the
State Act of March IO, 1864, chapter 346, (Laws of 1864,
page 482) as nodified by the subsequent Act of April 4,
1870, chapter 291, (Laws ot 1870, page 502).
Turner demurred, and his demurrer being overruled, September 20, 188o, he was fined. On appeal, this judgiment
was affirmed, January 21, 1881, on the ground that the
Colony, and subsequently the State, had always enforced compulsory inspection of tobacco, which vas not a tax on exports, within the Constitutional provision (sulra,page 425).
The object of inspection laws, ordinarily, is to improve the quality of
the productions of a country, and thereby better fit them for domestic
use or exportation. But we are by no means prepared to concede that
the inspection must be confined to an examination of the quality of the
article itself. To prepare the products of a State for exportation, it may
be necessary that such products should be put in packages of a certain
form, afid of certain prescribed dimensions. This may be necessary,
either on account of the nature and character of such products, or to enable the State to identify the products of its own growth and to furnish
the evidence of such identification in the markets to which they are exported: RoINsoN, J., Turner v. The Stale (I881), 55 Md. 240, 263-4.

The judgment was then removed to the Supreme Court of
the United States, and there finally affirmed, February 5,
1883, on a unanimous opinion by Justice BLATCHFORD, who
thought the views of the Maryland Court to be sound, and
added, thatFixing the identity and weight of tobacco alleged to have been grown
in the State, and thus preserving the reputation of the article in markets
outside of the State, is a legitimate part of inspection laws, and the
means prescribed therefor in the statutes in question, naturally conduce
to that end. Such provisions, as parts of inspection laws, are as proper
as provisions for inspecting quality, and it cannot be said thatthe absence
of the latter provisions, in respect to any particular class of tobacco, necessarily causes the laws containing the former provisions to cease to be in-
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spection laws. It is easy to see that the use of the precaution of weighing
and marking the weight on the hogshead, and recording it in a book, isto
enable it to be determined at any time, whether the contents have been
diminished subsequently to the original packing; by comparing a.new
weight with the original marked weight, or if the marked weight be altered, with the weight entered in the warehouse book. The things required to be done in respect to the hogshead of tobacco in the present case,
aside from any inspection of quality, are to be done to prepare and fit the
hogshead as a unit containing the tobacco, for exportation, and for
becoming an article of foreign commerce or commerce among the States,
and are to be done before it becomes such an article. They are properly
parts of inspection laws, withih the definition given by this Court in
Gibbonsv. Ogden (1824), 9 Wheat. (22 U. S.) I, 203: (17 Otto, 107 U. S.
49-50.)

The reference is to this language of ChiefJustice AIARSHALL,
in the famous New York case, after he had pointed out that
duties on imports or exports were parts of the taxing power,
which undoubtedly remained with the States, whereas the
regulation of foreign and interstate commerce (even by the
coasting license here held to override the New York Steamboat monopoly) by Congress could not be concurrent with
that by the States, individually: he then proceededBut the inspection laws are said to be regulations of commerce and are
certainly recognized in the Constitution, as being passed in the exercise
of a power remaining with the States. That inspection laws may have
a remote and considerable influence on commerce, will not be denied;
but that a power to regulate commerce is the source from which the right
to pass them is derived, cannot be admitted. The objects of inspection
laws is to improve the quality of articles produced by the labor of the
country; to fit them for exportation; or, it may be, for domestic use.
They act upon the subject before it becomes an article of foreign commerce, or of commerce among the States, and prepare it for that purpose.
They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation, which embraces
everything within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general
government; all which can be most advantageously exercised by the
States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, healthlaws of every
description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a
State, and those which respect turnpike roads, ferries, etc., are component parts of the mass: MARSHALL, C. J., Gibbons v. Og.den (1824), 9

Wheat.

(22 U. S.) I, 203.

The identity of inspection laws with those enacted under
the taxing power of the State, was declared anew in' this
Maryland case, in express recognition of the first statement
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of this classification, fifty-five years earlier, made in these
words:If it be a rule of interpretation to which all assent, that the exception
of a particular thing from general words, proves that, in the opinion of
the law-giver, the thing excepted would be within the general clause,
had the exemption not been made, we know no reason why this general
rule should not be as applicable to the Constitution as to other instruments. If it be applicable, then this exception in favorof duties for the
support of inspection laws [suqra, page 4253, goes far in proving that the
framers of the Constitution classed taxes of a similar character with those
imposed for the purposes of inspection, with duties on imports and exports, and supposed them to be prohibited: MARSHALL, 3., Browlt v.
Ad. (1827), 12 Wheat. (25 U. S.) 419,'438.

Contemporaneously with Turner v.

JWakrland, Justice

wrote the opinion in People v. Conifiagnie Generale
Transallanlique(1882), 17 Otto (io7 U. S.) 59, where the
New York laws, taxing immigTants, were declared void
(subra, page 465), because not legitimate inspection laws.
MILLER

In place of the definition given by Justice

BLATCHFORD,

in

Turner v. M~aryland(on page 55) and substantially stated
szora, page 813, there were these imperfect tests given by
the other Justice:What laws may be properly classed as inspection laws under this provision of the Constitution [suPra,page 425], must be largely determined
by the nature of the inspection laws of the States, at the time the Constitution was framed. * * * What is an inspection? Something which
can be accomplished by looking at or weighing or measuring the thing to
be inspected, or applying to it, at once, some crucial test. When testimony or evidence is to be taken and examined, it is not inspection in any
sense whatever: MILLER, J., Peoplev. Comnpagnie GeneraleTrans. (1883),
17 Otto (107 U. S.) 59, 61, 62.

Other attempts to define inspection laws have distinguished
their object as "to certify the quantity and value of the
articles inspected, whether imports or exports, for the protection of buyers and consumers": SwA.YNE, J., in Foslerv.

M7aster and Wardens of Akezc, Orleans (1877), 4 Otto (94
U. S.) 246, 247; but the latest substantially restates that dedared in Turner v. Afaryland; FULLER, C. J., sifra, page
502, quoting. from the opinion of MATTHEWS, J., in Bowman v. Chicago & N. W RR. Co. (1888), 125 U. S. 465,
488, and infra.
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After the Maryland law was thus declared to be a valid
inspection law, Justice BLATCHFORD, for the Court, proceeded
to point out that the second objection to the law, was equally
futile; that is, granting that there was no inspection and no
fee for tobacco to be manufactured in the State and then
transported out of its limits, still such preference of home
manufacturers was within the power of the State, if exercised
before the tobacco became an article of commerce. This is
evidently upon much the same principle as State taxation
of articles grown or prepared for sale out of the State but
not yet started; as was the case with the New Hampshire
timber in Coe v. Errol,izfra, page 821.
XXIII.

A State law, authorizing a municipality to collect whaifage
from vessels laden with the products of other States and couniries,while such dues are not demanded fiom vessels laden
witi the same articles when piroduced in the State, is a regulaiion of interstate commerce and is void.
The denial to the States, of the piower to lay any duty of
tonnage without le consent of Congress, was intended to
protect the freedom of commerce and therefore does not hzvalidate legitimale whaif dues measured by the capacity of
the vessels using the wharves.
Local taxation of vessels by their capacit, instead of by
value, is unconslitutional.
Guy v. Jfayor & City Council of Baltimore (i88o), io

Otto (1oo U. S.) 434, was another case of an unsuccessful
discrimination attempted by thelaws of Maryland. Captain
Guy of the schooner George S. Powell, was sued before a
justice of the peace by the City of Baltimore, June 29, 1876,
for not paying wharfage required by the City ordinance for a
cargo of potatoes raised in Virginia. This ordinance required wharfage for "articles sold by the bshel, other than
the product of the State of Maryland," under the authority
ofVOL. XXXVIII.-52.
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An Act to appoint State Wharfingersin the City of Baltimore, and to
authorizethe collection of wharfage in certain cases, in said City. (Passed
Mlarch, II, i828, Laws, chap. 162.)
Sac. 4. And be it enacted, That the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore shall be, aihdthey are hereby empowered and authorized to [may]
regulate, establish, charge and collect, tothe use of the [city] said Nayor
and City Council, such rate of wharfage as they may think reasonable,
of and from all vessels resorting to or lying at, landing, depositing, or
transporting goods, or articles other than the productions ofthis State, on
any vharf or wharves, belonging to the [city] said 71ayor and City Council,or any public wharf in the said City, other than the whartes belonging to or rented by the State: and that part of PrattStreet Wharf heretofore reserved for the use of citizens of this [the] State, anything in any
former act of Assembly to the contrarynotwithstanding.

This Section appeared in the Code of Public Local Laws
as section 945 of Article IV, and was changed by Act of

April 1o, 188o, chap. 218, Laws, page 356, Public Local
Laws, ed. 1888, Art. IV, § 368, by omitting the words in
italics and inserting those in brackets, as above: the unconstitutional discrimination was thus repealed.
Thejudgment entered against Guy by the justice of the
peace, was affirmed on appeal by the Baltimore City Court,
October 14, 1876, this Court denying that the commerce,
impost or equal rights clauses of the Constitution had been
violated. This was contrary to the decision of Chancellor
BLAND in The Wharf Case (183A), 3 Bland's Chan. (Md.)
361, 371, 374, where rival owners claimed the wharf dues
from certain wharves and the decree was that none should
be taken. The judgment was then removed to the Supreme
Court of the United States, and there reversed March 22,
188o, upon an opinion by Justice HARLAN, Chief Justice
WVAITIE dissenting on the peculiar ground that the State
had merely prohibited the City from collecting wharfage
from the products of the State. In principle, this is much
the same objection of preference by the United States Courts
'for strangers over inhabitants of -the State, as was raised in
Robbins v. Taxing District(ante, page 762) and there denied
upon the apparent ground that the State made the preference by its unconstitutional legislation.
The opinion of the Supreme Court proceeded on that
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principle of Brown v. Jfaiyland (szra,page 440), which
denied to the States, power to discriminate against the products of other States, by taxing them with discrimination in
favor of local products: the citations were of the later cases
relating to American products (szqra, pages 728, 735, 748,
751), but it is now clear that the distinction to be drawn in
such cases as Brown v. 3faryland and Brown v. Houston
sn~ra, pages 439, 732) is'in the extent of the taxation,
which cannot be imposed upon imports at all, and upon the
products of other States only without discrimination.
The wharfage charged to Captain Guy was- therefore regarded by the Supreme Court as a tax and not merely reasonable compensation for the use of the wharf. For it is to be
observed that the reasonableness of this fee, taken by itself,
was not denied. On the contrary, the opinion expressly
recognized the principles of three recent cases on the subject
of wharfage.
The first of these was Keokuk N. L. Packet Co. v. City of
Keokuk (1877) 5 Qtto (95 U. S.) 8o, where the Supreme
Court recognized the right of a municipality to collect
wharfage proportioned to the tonnage of the boats using the
particular landing. The rates were no more than sufficient
to pay the interest on the money borrowed to improve the
wharves, and the fact that they were measured by the capacity of the boats did not make this a tonnage tax within the
prohibition of the Constitution. That prohibition is directed against port dues or charge for use of the harbor and all
landing places, as declared in Cannonv. New Orleans (1874),
20 Wall. (87 U. S.) 577; The Northwestern Union Packet
Co. v. St. Patl(1874), U. S. Circ. Ct. Dist. Minn., 3 Dill.
454; The Southern Steamshi5 Co. v. Port Wardens (1867),
6 Wall. (73 U. S.) 31; Peele v. 2/organ (1874), 19
Wall. (86 U. S.) 581; State Tonnage Tax. Cases (1871),
12 Wall. (79 U. S.) 204; Cincinnati P. B. G. & P.
Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg (1882), 15 Otto (iO5 U. S.)
559 ; Parkersburg & 0. River Transfi. Co. v. Parkersburg (1883), 17 Otto (107 U. S.) 691; Zuse v. Glover
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(1886), I19 U. S. 543; Ouachita &A A. River Packet Co. v.
Aiken (1887), 121 Id. 444; Inman Steamshl5 Co. v. Tinker
(1876), 4 Otto (94 U. S.) 238 ; and not against reasonable
charges for use of property: FMELD, J., Glmucester Ferry
Co. v. Pa. (1885), 114 U. S. 196, 217 ; though, locally, vessels are also protected against taxation by the ton instead of
by value: State Tonnage Cases, Peele v. Mlorgan, Cannon v. New Orleans, and Steamshif Co. v. Tinker, szqfra;
that is, as the subject cannot be further developed here,Vhat was intended by the provisions of the second clause of the tenth
section of the first article [of the Constitution, supra, page, 425], was to
protect the freedom of commerce, and nothing more.

The prohibition of

a duty of tonnage should, therefore, be construed so as to carry out that
intent: STRONG, J., Keokuk N. L. Packet Co. v. Keokuk (1877), 5 Otto
(95 U. S.) 80, 87.

The second of these wharfage eases was the Vorthwestern
Union Packet Co. v. City of St. Louis (x88o) IO Otto (ioo U.
S.) 423, where the City was allowed to collect a tonnage
charge upon every vessel landing at any wharf in that City,
the charge being admittedly reasonable in amount for the use
of the improved wharf facilities and not for the raising of
general revenue. This decision was immediately affirmed
in the third of these cases that of Vicksburg v. Tobin (188o),
Id. 43 o . These two cases, were decided three weeks before
Guy v. Baltimore, so that the whole subject of wharfage
was before the Court in its two aspects of tonnage taxation
and preference for local vessels or products.
So far as any attempt might be made to obtain general
revenue from wharfage, the unconstitutionality of such laws
was again declared by Justice MILLER, in Aforgan's La. &_
RR. & Steamshifi Co. v. Louisiana (1886), XI8 U. S.
ST.
455, 462; and by Justice BRADLEY, in Ouachita & Af.
River Packet Co. v. Aiken (1887), 121 Id. 444. In this respect, there was nothing else than a reaffirmance of the principles of the Passenger Cases, szora, page 460.
The unconstitutionality of the preference shown by the
Maryland law in the wharfage dues, has been distinctly recognized by justice SWAYNE, in Yachine Co. v. Gage, sizqra,
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page 753; Justice BRADLEY, in Walling v. Vichigan, szipra,
page 738, and Phila. & S. M. S. Co. v. Pa. (1887), 122 U. S.
326, 345 ; Justice BLATCHFORD in Pickard v. Pullman S.
Car Co. (1886), 117 Id. 34, 49.
XXIV.

Logs temfiorarily stopbed by low waler, in their course
througlh a Stale fromn one State to a third, cannot be taxed
where they arestoiped.
Propierty can be taxed where it is situated,though the own,eris a resident of another State.
Thefproducts of a State may be laxed,though intendedfor
removal to another State or country, until they aredelivered to
a common carrieror their ultimate piassage from the State
has begun.
The case of Coe v. The Town of Errol (1886), 116 U. S.
517, began in the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, June
25, 1881, by the plaintifPs petition for relief from taxation
upon logs destined for manufacture and sale in the State of
Maine, but then lying in the said Town of Errol. Some of
these logs had been cut in New Hampshire and some in
Maine, though being detained by low water in the Androscoggin; but all of them were alleged to be in transit to
market from one State to another. The taxation on the logs
cut in Maine was directed to be abated (Coe v. Errol,
1882, 62 N. H-. 303, 313), but that on the logs cut in New
Hampshire was declared valid, BLODGET', J., sayingThe assessments were made under s. 13, c. 54, Gen. Laws, which provides
that wood, bark, timber, logs, and lumber, manufactured or other, exceeding fifty dollars in value, shall be taxed at its full value, in the town
But it is urged that inwhere it is on the first day of April. " "
asmuch as the logs were in transit and seeking a market in another
State, the tax imposed was one upon commerce, and therefore in conflict
with the federal Constitution. This contention is groundless. At most,
the statute under which the assessment was made, simply acts upon and
affects property which may be the subject of commerce. But a tax on
property that may be the subject of commerce under Congressional regulation, is not a tax on commerce, buton property: Scottv. Wilson (1825),
3 N. H. 321, 326 ; Cooley, Tax. 62 ; neither is a tax on property that has
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been the subject of such commerce, where it is taxed only as property,.
and in common with all other property within the State: Brown v.
Maryland (1827), 12 Wheat. (25 U. S.) 419; Pervear v. Comm. (1865), 5
IWall. (72 U. S.) 475, 479; Wraring v. The Mfayor (1868), 8 Wall. (75 U.
S.) Iio. The conclusion then is, that the logs in question, having at thetime of their taxation, an actual and legal silus in this State, and having
been taxed only as property and in common with all other property, under a law making no discrimination in respect of ownership, no case is
made for relief: (62 N. H. 312, 313).

The case having been removed to the Supreme Court of
the United States, the judgment was there affirmed on a
unanimous opinion by Justice BRADLEY, who denied the
two propositions of the log owner, respecting the logs cut in

New Hampshire, but not yet removed from the State. The
first was, that his property could not be taxed because he was.
a resident of another State, and by legal fiction, his property
had its sihis in Maine. But the Court thought the power of
State taxation was too plain for citation of authorities.
The second proposition was, that the products of a State,
though intended for removal to another State and partially
prepared by removal to a place of shipment, were not liable
to State taxation. But the Court thought this untenable
because making taxation dependent upon the owner's state of
mind and incomplete action. That isWhen the products of the farm or the forest are collected and brought
in from the surrounding country to a town or station serving as an entrepot for that particular region, whether on a river or a line of railroad,
such products are not yet exports, nor are they in the process of exportation, nor is exportation begun until they are committed to the common
carrier for transportation out of the State to the State of their destination, or have started on their ultimate passage to that State. Until then
it is reasonable to regard them as not only within the State of their
origin, but as a part of the general mass of property of that State, subject
to its jurisdiction and liable to taxation there, if not taxed by reason of
their being intended for exportation, but taxed without any discrimination, in the usual way and manner in which such property is taxed in the.
State. * * - Although intended for exportation, they may never be
exported; the owner has a perfect right to change his mind; and until
actually put in motion, for some place out of the State, or committed to
the custody of a carrier for transportation to such place, why may they
not be regarded as still remaining a part of the general mass of property
in the State? BRADLEY, J., Coe v. Errol(I886), i6 U. S. 525-6.

This was not a new sentiment in the Supreme Court of
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the United States. Thirty-four years earlier, when limiting
the operation of a United States coasting license to navigable waters, and thereby giving a State full control over
streamns entirely within its borders, and not naturally navigable, and not part of a line of interstate commerce (supra,
pages 482-3 and 8oo), the Court, speaking by Justice DA-NL
IEL, repudiated an extension of the commerce power over
the products of domestic. enterprise, in agri~ulture, or manufactures, or in the arts, because ultimately liable or intended
to enter into foreign or domestic commerce.
A pretension as far-reaching as this, -vould extend to contracts between
citizen and citizen of the same State, would control the pursuits of the
planter, the grazier, the manufacturer, the mechanic, the immense operations of the collieries and mines and furnaces of the country; for
there is not one of these avocations the results of which may not become
the subjects of foreign commerce, and be borne either by turnpikes,
canals or railroads, from point to point within the several States, towards
an ultimate destination, like the one mentioned : DANIEL, J., Veazie V.
.3foor (1852), 14 How. (55 U. S.) 574.

It will be remembered from the review of Brown v.
I-ousion (supra,page 732), that there is a distinction also
between the termination of interstate and foreign carriage,
in respect to'the period when a State may begin to lay ordinary (as distinguished from discriminative) taxation: that
is, an import cannot be taxed until broken up or otherwise
mingled with and lost in the common mass of property
(si pra, pages 439, 443); but goods are imports only when
brought in from foreign nations, and not from other States
of the Union (supra, pages 719-20); and therefore the
ordinary powers of State taxation are not defeated by
retaining domestic goods in their original packages. But
in respect to restraints upon interstate commerc, though
not so expressed and laid equally on all property in the
State in otherwise the most unobjectionable form of taxation, license, or other police regulation, all such restraints
are simply void as to merchandise in the original packages,
though valid as to other property in the State (infra, page
824).
The case of Clarke v. Clarke, in the United States Circuit
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Court for the Southern District of Georgia, 3 Woods 408,
has already been alluded to (supra, page 444); further attention may here be given to its facts, for the logs upon which
the tax was levied, were the property of persons exclusively
engaged in exporting timber to foreign countries, and had
been purchased for the purpose of export, their shipment being deferred for want of vessels. The Circuit Judge (WOODS)
was urged to dfeclare the logs not yet separated from the
mass of property taxable; he declined upon the solitary
ground of their being exports, and not that they were to be
carried out of the State generally and perchance to another
State. The decision would not, therefore, be contrary to the
rule declared in Coe v. Errol, until the business of an exporter is denied to be an agency of foreign commerce. The
decisive test used by Justice BRADLEY (siora,page 822), of
ability to change intention and not remove the property from
the State after it has escaped from taxation, would not apply
to a mere exporter, but only to one who carried on a dual
business of exporting and American trade. This dual business caused the taxation of the coal actually exported in
1
Brown v. Houston (MPra,page 732).
The substance of the whole subject is, that the State's
power of taxation continues until it actually collides with the
Constitutional freedom of foreign and interstate commerce.
Xxv.
A State cannotrevent a common carrierfrom recei z ng
merchandisein another State and carrying it into its territory, andthere delivering it to the consigwee.
Znto-ricating liquors are merchandisewhich a common cartier cannot refitse to receive, because the State into which intoxzicatibg liquors are consigned,forbids their carriage into
its terriztoiy.
Bowman et al. v. Chicago & N. W. RR. Co. (1888), 125
U. S. 465, came into the Supreme Court of the United States
from the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois, to revise the entry of judgment (October 6,
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1886), for the railroad company upon their demurrer to an
action brought (June 15, i886), by Bowman Brothers, for a
refusal to transport five thousand barrels of beer from Chicago
to Marshalltown in the State of Iowa. Admitting the duty
of a railroad as a common carrier, the defense was put upon
the ground that the State of Iowa had prevented the railroad
company from receiving and transporting into Iowa the
beer in question byCHAPTER 66. AN ACT Amendatory of Chapter 143 of the Acts of the
Twentieth General Assembly Relating to Intoxicating Liquors and Providing for the More Effectual Suppression of the Illegal Sale and Transportation of Intoxicating Liquors and Abatement of Nuisances. (Passed
April 5, 1886: Laws, page 8.)

SEc'rioN TEN. That section 1553 of the Code, as amended and substituted by Chapter 143 of the Acts of the Twentieth General Assembly,
be, and the same is hereby repealed, and the following enacted in lieu
thereof:
SECTION 1553. If any express company, railway company, or any
agent or person in the employ of any express company or railway company, or if any common carrier or any person in the employ of any common carrier, or any person, knowingly bring within this State, for any
person or persons or corporation, or shall knowingly transport or convey
between points or from one place to another within this State, for any
other person or persons or corporations, any intoxicating liquors, without
first having been furnished with a certificate from and under the seal of
the County Auditor of the County to which said liquor is to be transported, or is consigned for transportation, or within which it is to be conveyed from place to place, certifying that the consignee or person to
whom said liquor is to be transported, conveyed or delivered, is authorized
to sell such intoxicating liquors in such County, such company, corporation or person so offending, and each of them, and any agent of such company, corporation or person so offending, shall, upon conviction thereof,
be fined in the sum of one hundred dollars for each offense, and pay costs
ofprosecution; and the costs shall * " ", include a reasonable attorney
fee, to be assessed by the court, which shall be paid into the County * "
fund, and shall stand committed to the County jail until such fine and
costs of prosecution are paid. The offense herein defined, shall be held
to be complete, and shall be held to have been committed in any County
of the State through or to which said intoxicating liquors are transported, or in which the same is unloaded for transportation, or in which
said liquors are conveyed from place to place or delivered. It shall be
the duty of the several County Auditors of this State to issue the Certificate herein contemplated, to any person having such permit; and the
certificate so issued shall. be truly dated when issued, and shall specify
the date at which the permit expires, as shown by the County Records.
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In the Supreme Court of the United States, the Attorney
General of Iowa also took part in the argument to sustain
the validity of the State law: and his most important position was that the act was simply intended to prevent the sale
and use of intoxicating liquors within the State, as property
prejudicial to health, morality and good order. Justice
MATTimEWS, writing the opinion of the majority of the
Court, conceded that this was -the object of the law, as one
of a system-of legislation upon the sale and use of intoxicating liquors, among which beer had been placed by statute
(page 475), but still denied the validity of such a law, because it was a restraint upon transportation of freight, and
thus in effect a regulation of commerce (page 486.)
Upon the question of State regulation of the manufacture and sale of liquor, there was no retreat from the position taken by the Court in Jlfgler v. Kansas (1887), 123 U.
S. 623, where State prohibition of the manufacture of liquor
was declared to be valid, even though property should be
rendered useless, or abated as a nuisance and no compensation be made. This Mugler Case remains the law of the
Court: the Orgiinal Package Case, szqfra, pages 509, 511,
517, 518; though the right of every citizen to pursue an
ordinary calling and in it to buy and sell property, is recognized as far as it does not conflict with the legitimate exercise of State police power, in Powell v. Pa.(I888), 127 U.
S. 678 ; Kidd v. Pearson (1888), 128 Id. i ; Eilenbecker v.
Iowa (189o), 134 Id. 31 ; and Minnesota v. Barber (I89O),
136 Id. 313 and sufira, page 807. The distinction pointed
out by Justice FIELD (in his concurring opinion in this
Bowman case, at page 5o6) between the Mugler and the
Bowman cases, was drawn at the origin of the merchandise,
as beyond or within the State boundaries, because of the
principle established in Brown v. Maryland (szqfra, page
439), that the right to import from a foreign country, or to
bring in from another State, carried with it the right to sell
in the original package.
Justice MATTHEWS recognized that the judgment in the
License Cases (szqfra, page 453) closely approached the ques-
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tion in hand, but finally distinguished the present case upon
the important point of the time when transportation terminated (page 479 of the opinion.) The law of Iowa sought
to prevent that delivery, and a large part of the opinion was
devoted to the vindication of the exclusiveness of the Constitutional power to regulate commerce (pages 486, 495, and
Justice FIELD, concurring, page 5oo), without which it
would be idle to discuss the moment when the State police
power could attach (page 499.)
In another aspect the Iowa law was declared to be no immunity as an inspection law. Turnerv. Mvaryland was unqualifiedly followed as already observed (szora, page 816.)
In still another aspect, the Iowa law was not recognized as
a quarantine or sanitary regulation, as it singled out certain
merchandise to be removed from the commercial commodities of the country. Here, the remarks of Justice
CA'rRON, in the License Cases, (supra, page 457) as well as
those of Chief Justice TANE Y, were approved by both Justice MArHEws and Justice FIELD (pages 490, 501, 503 of
the report.) The judgments in RR. Co. v. -hesen (sufira,

page 8o0) and the more recent Passenger Cases (sztfira, page
465) all precluded the recognition of such power in the
the States, and the motive of the Iowa law could not save it
from the condemnation of seeking to ward off the evils of intemperance by prohibiting interstate commerce (page 498 of
the opinion.)
Justice FIELD (in his concurring opinion at page 502),
went further and called attention to his dissent in Mfugler v.
K:ansas (1887), 123 U. S. 623, 675, as indicating, without
expressing, his opinion, that no State could prohibit the sale
of merchandise which Congress might authorize to be
brought into a State: forIt is a matter of history that one of the great objects of the formation
of the Constitution was to secure unanimity of commercial regulations
and thus put an end to restrictive and hostile discriminations by one State
against the products of other States, and against their importation and
sale. [Qnoting from Brown v. AMary4and, the words on page 416, supira.]
If the States have the power asserted, to exclude from importation
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within their limits, any articles of commerce, because in their judgment
the articles may be injurious to their interests or policy, they may prescribe conditions upon which such importation will beadmitted, and thus
establish a system of duties as hostile to free commerce among the States
as any that existed previous to the adoption of the Constitution: F=r~rD,
J., concurring in Bowman v. Chicago & N. IV. R. Co. (1888), 125 U.
S. 465,509.

As Chief Justice WAITE and Justices GRAY and HARLAN
dissented in the Bowman case, it is not surprising that the
two surviving Justices dissented in the Original Package
Case, so much foreshadowed, and even decided (per FIELD,

J., at page 504) in the former case.

In both instances, the

License Cases were the test by which these Justices found
a difference between the judgment of the Court and the exceptional principles recognized in Gibbons v. Ogden (s=ira,
pages 428, 52o,) The Chestnut Street Bridge Case (445,
534), RR. Co. v. Zusen (538, 8ol) and Patterson v. K'enlucky (515, 742.)
XXVI.

OriginalPackages offermented, distilled and other intoxicating liquors or liquids, are now subjected by Congress to
the 15olicero'wer of thm several States and Territories.
An Act to limit the effect of the regulations of commerce between the
several States and with foreign countries in certain cases.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representativesof the United
States of America in Congress assembled: That all fermented, distilled or
other intoxicating liquors or liquids transported into any State or Territory or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale or storage therein,
shall upon arrival in such State or Territory be subject to the operation
and effect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of
its police powers, to the same extent and in the same manner as though
such liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or Territory, and
shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in
original packages or otherwise.
Approved August 8, 189o.

This is the so-called Wilson bill, which became a law during the preparation of a portion of this article. As it has
been immediately challenged, and a decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States may be expected at no distant
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day, the intended discussion of this act may be deferred at
this place. All the other articles which are capable of becoming original packages, are, of course, now deliberately
suffered by Congress to remain under the various rulings of
the Supreme Court which have been considered with some
minuteness. For the proposed bill, with a general operation, failed to pass, and the efforts to prevent the introduction of dressed beef and to exclude drummers, if renewed,
cannot profit by the moral excitement produced by the
Original Package decision of i89o.
XXVII.
SUMMARY.

(The figures in the following sentences refer to the preceding pages.)

The extent of the subject and the advantage of a full
statement of the facts of each case considered, have required
the elimination of all decisions not connected with the sale
of merchandise, or not declaring common principles in an
instructive form. In this manner, there has been eliminated
almost all consideration of the power to embargo conercial
intercourse (427); ferries ; the control of immigration (459);
inspection laws (813); liquor laws (826); mail routes and
post roads (477); navigable waters (745); laws governing
pilots (474); port regulations; the power to lay protective
duties on imports (427); quarantine laws (8Ol); the regulation of the rates, tariffs, charges and other traffic arrangements by rail and water (438); the restraint of the slave
trade (427); the taxation and regulation of telegraph, express, railroad, transportation, steamboat and other corporations (765) engaged in interstate commerce (799); rights obtained by treaty (427); and wharfage, except as briefly alluded
to on pages 817-21.
The law declared in the cases considered in the preceding
pages, rests upon the fundamental principle of the supremacy
of the Constitutional power to regulate foreign and interstate
commerce (425). No State power can, under any name or
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theory (42I), oppose or restrain (474), the immunity thus
conferred upon the exterior commerce of the several States
of the Union.
This supremacy was supposed by Kent and the New York
jurists (430), to lie dormant until Congress positively regulated commerce, although the appropriate spheres of State
and National action are defined for different purposes (473),
and impinge upon each other only as they seek to regulate
the same subjects (425). This is true in the choice of either
definition of the police power of the States (411). The dormant theory, therefore, failed of recognition by the Supreme
Court (435) as early as 1824, because it involved a claim of
concurrent power (472) in the States to regulate commerce
except where expressly restrained by the Constitution (436).
Such strict construction has always been denied (418), and
the resulting definition of commerce, in Gibbons v. Ogden
(428), as commercial intercourse, has led the Supreme Court
on to the declaration that the Constitutional power is active,
and being supreme, is therefore exclusive (803).
An exclusive power to regulate commerce involves a
choice of much or little regulation, so that Congress has the
power to suffer commercial intercourse to be free of restraint
(473), and inevitably, therefore, Congressional nonaction is as
potent (464) as is the supremacy of Constitutional Acts, formally passed by both the House and Senate with the approval of the President or over his veto (428).
. The exclusiveness of the Constitutional power to regulate
commerce has been construed by the Supreme Court of the
United States, as either absolute or relative (466), in order to
prevent unnecessary prostration of State authority over subjects not requiring exemption on principle (468). The effect
of this construction is to direct the student and jurist alike,
to the decisions of the Court (753) as defining from time to
time the bounds of State legislation affecting the commercial
intercourse of our country (422). A general rule was formulated by Justice CuRTIS, in Cooley v. Port Wardens (470),
but its full effect has scarcely been .realized until the Original Package Case (491) of 189o, on account of the more
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popular, though previous judgment of the same Court in the
License Cases (453). It would be an error, however, to
overlook the power in Congress to legalize an interference
with commercial intercourse (474), and in this way reverse
a decree of the Supreme Court (477). The Court is not superior to Congress, and its construction is largely due to
Congressional failure to act (42).
When Congress proceeds to act, the choice of means to be
used is expressly (423) confided to it without its legislation
being restricted to such laws as might be indispensably necessary, or any more than conducive to the exercise of the
Constitutional.power.
Congress cannot surrender its power over commerce, as by
an act admitting a State into the Union (474), though it
can adopt for the time being, such local regulations as are
deemed suitable (472).
The power to regulate commerce cannot be exercised by
Congress, without limit (74 i); for it may neither tax or lay
a duty on exports from any State (424) ; nor prefer the ports
of one State over those of another, though in making regulations for other purposes (797), a discrimination may be
made between ports in the same State (478); and Congressional regulations of commerce must not be local (748) where
general regulations are proper and necessary.
This Constitutional power to regulate commerce is not
general but confined to three fields of action (42o), as it is
with foreigu nations, among the States and Territories of
the Union, including the District of Columbia (748), and
with the Indian Tribes (721). In determining whether
commerce falls into one of these divisions or is local, the fact
of transshipment, or change of carriers, is insufficient of itself
to fix the local character of the traffic (743) as the Court will
look to the ultimate destination of the articles. Excepting
these divisions of commerce, each State has entire control
(448) over the business, trade (800), manufactures (722) and
traffic carried on within its borders (435), not only as long
as they are not parts of interstate or foreign commerce (743),
but equally so when intended to, though aztually not yet
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become such parts (817). Consequently, a State may even
prefer strangers above its own citizens (762), and generally
may act until it passes the limits set by the Constitutional
provisions for the due process of law (515) and for the equal
rights of citizens of other States (750). These are the
clauses usually invoked with the commerce clause, in cases
of supposed interference with commercial intercourse.
From the fact that this local jurisdiction remains with the
States, it follows that Congress cannot exercise police powers
in the States (741), or elsewhere than in the Territories and
other places within its exclusive jurisdiction. Hence, an
act of Congress forbidding the sale of certain coal oil (741) is
invalid in a State: and a patent granted by the United
States, cannot authorize the sale of patented articles when
forbidden by State enactments (741). Licenses are issued
by the United States under the taxing and under the commerce powers (724). Under the latter they are regulations
of commerce and confer the right to trade (43I), so that they
cannot be nullified by State laws (428). But under the taxing power, licenses do not confer any immunity from State
regulation of the licensed business (721). Some examples
will elucidate this difference between the two kinds of licenses. A coasting license is issued under the commerce
power (428), but an Internal Revenue license, issued to a
lottery ticket seller or a liquor dealer, is issued under the
taxing power (721). A steamboat license is issued under
the commerct power, and may be required to be taken by
every boat carrying freight and passengers ultimately destined to a point without the State, though the boat navigates only waters within the State (743)As already indicated (830), there is even a State control
over outgoing and incoming commerce. This is a result of
the division of the Constitutional power into absolutely exclusive and that which is merely relative. The general rule
is in substance, that Congressional regulation (465) and nonaction (466) alike, are exclusive of both direct interference
by the States (453) and even local legislation for other purposes (739), where the subjects of foreign and interstate
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commerce are, in their nature, national (453) or admit of but
one uniform system or plan of *regulation. All other out-,
going and incoming commercial intercourse may be regalated by the State (445) until there is a collision with Congressional enactment (420). Hence, until Congress makes
some regulation of the charges for the use of grain ele-.
vators and such other instruments of interstate commerce as.
are situate wholly within a State, licenses and charges may
be prescribed by that State as matters of local regulation
(797). This absolute exclusiveness of the Constitutional
power prevents a State from declaring both what articles
may be brought into its territory by a common carrier (824),
and what products of another State may be owned or possessed within its territory (8oi): otherwise the States have.
entire .control over their local affairs, such as the prevention
of disease, pestilence and pauperism (457) so long as a single
article or class of articles is not excluded from the State
(806). Hence, the captain of an incoming vessel may be
required to report his passenger list (448), including the
name and quality of every person on board (452), but he
cannot be compelled to pay any tax or fee (465), or to be responsible for any persons he may land as immigrants or
interstate passengers (459). Similarly only diseased cattle,
or those actually fit for quarantine regulations, and not all
cattle coming from another State, may be excluded (8oi).
And health regulations must be reasonable, and not prescribe an inspection of cattle such a brief time before slaughter, as to prevent the carriage of the carcasses from one
State to another (8oi). The relative exclusiveness of the
Constitutional power permits valid State legislation respecting pilots (466), inspection and quarantine or other health
regulations. The courts and not the State legislatures are
the proper organs of government to decide when such laws
extend beyond the danger apprehended by the lawmakers,
into the regulation of that part of interstate commerce over
which the Constitutional power is absolutely exclusive (8oi).
Inspection laws are part of the State legislation embracing everything within the territory of the State which has
VOL. XXXVIII-53.
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not been placed in the care and control of the United States
(813), and is not, therefore, derived from any power to regulate commerce, but from the right to improve the quality of
domestic articles before they enter into commerce (813). A
State may, therefore, require tobacco casks to be weighed
and measured at a particular place, before transportation out
of the State, though no such requirements are exacted in
respect to tobacco transported from place to place within the
State (813). Consequently legitimate inspection laws relate
to the quality of the articles, their form, or capacity, and the
weight and dimensions of their packages, to be ascertained
by a public officer at any rea~onable place fixed by law (813).
If these inspection laws are inequitable though legitimate,
and the States enforce them, Congress and not the courts.
must interfere (813).

. The States cannot regulate or forbid immigration (459),
though they may enforce legitimate quarantine and poor
laws so long as they do not attempt to lay a tax on immigrants (460).
The ccinmerce to be regulated, is more than traffic (424)
or the exchange of goods (433): it includes the article, the
vehicle, the agent, and their various operations, and is therefore defined as a unit, comprehending every species of conmercial intercourse (427), of persons and things (462) both
outwards from a State as well as into its jurisdiction (748)This extended definition was one of the first required of the
Court, and was made as the foundation for the further one
that navigation is a part of the commerce to be regulated by
Congress.(428) as one of the instruments of commercial intercourse (434)This regulation of navigation extends to the -carriage of
interstate and foreign passengers (459) and merchandise
.(743), not only on the high seas, but also on the bays, harbors, lakes, and all 'other navigable waters (459) of the
United States (43i). For the convenience of this carriage,
Congress may authorize the construction of dykes and other
structures (475), and, further, has the authority to decide
between water and land carriage in the erection of bridges
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and other obstructions (474). In this respect the States
also are not excluded from a partial exercise of a power to
bridge, dam and otherwise obstruct streams. This is a consequence of the division of the Constitutional power (830)
and of the local authority of the States (83 1.)
The general rules respecting bridges, dams and other
structures, are that the State has entire control over its
own purely internal and nonnavigable waters (482); over
other internal waters, the State may legislate until Congress
positively regulates the interstate and foreign commerce
upon and over such waters (483); over waters lying between
two or more States, each State may legislate as to its soil
until Congress interferes, unless a general regulation by Congress would be more appropriate (483).
The legitimate wharf dues are matters for local regulation, until Congress interferes, and may be measured by the
capacity of the vessels using the wharves (817) notwithstanding the Constitutional denial to the States of the power
to lay any duty of tonnage without the consent of Congress
(425), aq this prohibition was merely intended to protect
the freedom of commerce. Consequently, a State law authorizing a municipality to collect wharfage from vessels
laden with the products of other States and countries, but
not from those .laden with similar products of the State, is
void (817) as a regulation of commerce.
What is an article of commerce can only be determined
by the usages of trade (457), and a. State cannot declare an
article not to be the subject of commerce so as to exclude it
(503). Such definition 'is not within the police power of
the States (414). Hence, intoxicating liquors are merchandise which a-common carrier cannot refuse to receive merely
because the State into which they are consigned, forbids
their carriage into its territory (824).
The instruments of commerce (450), the passengers carried (459), and the articles brought into a State (456), do
not become subject to the State regulation of internal commerce as soon as they enter the territory of tme State (823),
or upon delivery to the consignee (489), or until each
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instance of commercial intercourse with foreign nations 'or
among the several States and Territories of the Union, has
terminated (428). Such is the force of the word "among";
it cannot be satisfied by a final termination outside of (746),
but only within (435), a State. Of this termination, the
test for merchandise is the action of the importer or consignee in breaking up the original packages in which the
articles have been brought into the State (443), or the use
of the articles as property in the State (491). For the right
to import or to bring into the State, includes power in the
importer or consignee to sell the articles in their original
packages (443).
An original package is a bale, bundle, crate, cask, box, or
other parcel of goods, packed for importation from a foreign
country, or for transportation from one State oi Territory of
the Union to another (443); it does not receive this appellation from having paid a tax or license to the United
States (721).
Imports and exports are articles of foreign commerce car-'
ried into or to be shipped away from a State or Territory
(823); they are not terms applicable to articles carried from
State- to State (727), a distinction of importance in apprehending the extent of State taxation, as distinguished from
the operation of State police power. For a State may not
tax an import (443) or an importer (439) but may subject
original packages from other States of the Union (727) to
the same taxation as other property in the State (735), so
long as discrimination is avoided. Similarly, auction sales
of original packages of foreign origin, cannot be taxed either
directly, or indirectly by way of license exacted from the
auctioneer: but goods produced in one of the States of the
Union may be taxed while awaiting sale in another or when
offered at auction (8io).
In all cases, a State tax upon an instrument of commerce,
as a drummer (747), importer (439), dealer or agent (764), is
regarded as a tax upon the articles offered for sale, whether
they are imports (439) or carried from another State (734),
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and whether the agent or other person or thing taxed, is
essential to commerce or merely advantageous (748).
A State cannot tax foreign or interstate commerce, by laying charges upon the business of transportation, or the receipts from transportation (761), upon immigration (46o),
or travelers from State to State (463), upon any kind of
commercial intercourse passing through its territory or
merely contracted to occur among other States (748), upon
articles produced in another State (728) because of their
origin, or operating to prevent commercial intercourse of
person and things (461) or to discriminate against articles
because of their origin out of the State (752). Hence, State
taxes cannot be laid upon exports (425), or goods purchased
for removal to a foreign country (824), though taxes may be
collected from original packages of domestic goods which
are afterwards actually exported (732). This difference
arises from an intention to export counting for naught, unless the articles are actually in some degree on their way,
either by delivery to a common carrier or some similarly significant act (821). But a temporary stoppage of the transportation, by transshipment (743) or by impediments, as low
water in a logging stream (821), do not suffer the State to
lay taxes.
There is no restriction upon State taxation upon property
within its jurisdiction (732), certainly not on account of the
nonresidence of the owner (821), so long'as the Constitutional freedom of commerce is not interfered with by discrimination, either intentional or in effect (824). Of course,
the Constitutional prohibition against a tonnage tax (425) is
a special exception to this general statement, for local taxation of vessels by their capacity, instead, of by their value, is
unconstitutional (817).
A general State tax or license may be laid upon a kind of
business whose subjects may enter into interstate and foreign
commerce, so long as the commerce itself is not made a
matter of privilege (8io). Consequently, a drummer traveling for a resident merchant cannot be taxed discriminatively
because he sells the products of another State (735): and if
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he travel for a nonresident finn, he cannot be taxed at all
(748). Similarly, the agent of a distant interstate railroad
may solicit passengers for his road without paying a State
license fee (748). And a nonresident cannot be required to
pay a tax measured by his stock of goods in another State,
or by his capacity to carry on his business all over the
United States, and not merely within the taxing State (747).
Upon the question of a remedy, the United States Courts.
may enjoin an interference with commercial intercourse
which amounts to a nuisance or creates irreparable damage,
notwithstanding the absence of Congressional action either
upon the particular subject or generally, prohibiting and
punishing nuisances (474). In such case a State has been
allowed to sue for an injunction against obstructions to commercial intercourse authorized by another State (474)Finally, it may be observed that the principles of the
License Cases appear to have been denied within five years
after their formulation (753) and are now considered as distinctly overthrown (507). A recognition of this fact and an
apprehension of the more equitable rule first formulated in
Cooley v. Port Wardens (466) would undoubtedly render the
whole subject of the law governing an original package,
one of easy comprehension, as well as of rational constfuction of the words of the Constitution.
JOHN B. UHLE.

